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One of the first idioms English-speaking children learn is 
that “You can’t judge a book by its cover.” This metaphor-
ical phrase is meant to convey the principle that appear-
ance is not a good and reliable way to make judgments 
about others. How people look, whether in regard to their 
attractiveness, their clothing, or the color of their skin, is 
but a very thin slice of a whole, complex human being, 
making it unlikely that any one attribute or set of attri-
butes can accurately convey the complexity of another 
person. This idiom is likely so common because snap 
judgments, which often arise from stereotypes and implicit 
biases, are difficult to overcome (Cox, Abramson, Devine, 
& Hollon, 2012; Devine, 1989; Devine, Forscher, Austin, & 
Cox, 2012). A key reason for this difficulty is the existence 
of legitimizing myths—personal or cultural narratives that, 
one way or another, support reliance on processes such as 
stereotyping, snap judgments, or intuitions (e.g., Chen & 
Tyler, 2001; Glaser, 2005; Pettigrew, 1979; Quist & Resen-
dez, 2002; Sidanius, Devereux, & Pratto, 1992; Uhlmann & 
Cohen, 2007). In a recent article (Cox, Devine, Bischmann, 
& Hyde, 2016), we identified how one such cultural nar-
rative, “the gaydar myth,” perpetuates stereotyping to in-
fer sexual orientation. 
The Gaydar Myth and Stereotyping to Infer 
Orientation 
Because sexual orientation is not a visible group status, 
people often rely on stereotypic attributes commonly as-
sociated with gay men and lesbian women, such as fash-
ion or career choice, to make snap judgments about who 
is gay or lesbian (Cox & Devine, 2015). Whereas stereotyp-
ing is often considered inappropriate (Cox & Devine, 2015; 
Devine, 1989; Devine & Elliot, 1995), giving this specific 
stereotyping process the alternate label of “gaydar” makes 
it seem acceptable. In other words, the gaydar myth le-
gitimizes stereotyping to infer orientation. In a high-pow-
ered experiment (Cox et al., 2016, Study 5; achieved power 
for observed effect, 1 − β > 0.999), we demonstrated that, 
compared to a control group, people who were led to 
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Abstract
In recent years, several empirical studies have claimed to provide evidence in support of the popular folk notion that people pos-
sess “gaydar” that enables them to accurately identify who is gay or lesbian (Rule, Johnson, & Freeman, 2016). This conclusion is 
limited to artificial lab settings, however, and when translated to real-world settings this work itself provides evidence that people’s 
judgments about who is gay/lesbian are not pragmatically accurate. We also briefly review evidence related to the consequences of 
perpetuating the idea of gaydar (i.e., “the gaydar myth”). Although past claims about accurate orientation perception are mislead-
ing, the work that gave rise to those claims can nevertheless inform the literature in meaningful ways. We offer some recommen-
dations for how the evidence in past “gaydar” research can be reappraised to inform our understanding of social perception and 
group similarities/differences.  
1
digitalcommons.unl.edu
2 Cox et  al .  in The Journal of  Sex Research,  2017 
believe that “gaydar is real” relied more heavily on stereo-
types to categorize men as gay. People who were told that 
gaydar is merely another term for stereotyping, however, 
stereotyped at much lower rates, even though they were 
neither discouraged from stereotyping nor told that the 
stereotypes were inaccurate. These results directly dem-
onstrate that the folk notion of gaydar serves the function 
of a legitimizing myth: Rhetoric that authenticates gaydar 
increases stereotyping, but identifying gaydar as stereo-
typing decreases reliance on stereotypes. 
The people who rely most on stereotype-based gaydar 
are also more motivated to express prejudice (Forscher, 
Cox, Graetz, & Devine, 2015), and using stereotypes to pri-
vately make a snap judgment that someone is gay grants 
“plausible deniability” to express anti-gay aggression (Cox 
& Devine, 2014). In an aggression study using real elec-
tric shocks, a key subset of people took advantage of this 
plausible deniability as a smokescreen for their anti-gay 
prejudice, administering high levels of electric shocks to 
a man who was stereotypically implied to be gay (Cox & 
Devine, 2014). Although the cultural notion of gaydar may 
seem lighthearted, evidence indicates that the stereotyp-
ing processes camouflaged under the guise of gaydar can 
have pernicious effects. 
Inaccuracy of Gaydar 
Whether or not stereotyping relates to other adverse con-
sequences, it is possible for stereotypes to yield accurate 
snap judgments. In fact, as reviewed extensively by Rule 
and colleagues (2016) in reply to our recent article (Cox 
et al., 2016), several researchers claim that people’s snap 
judgments about sexual orientation are largely accurate 
(e.g., Gaudio, 1994; Johnson, Gill, Reichman, & Tassinary, 
2007; Rieger, Linsenmeier, Gygax, Garcia, & Bailey, 2010; 
Rule, Ambady, Adams, & Macrae, 2008). We argued that 
the conclusions of this past work were misleading and in-
correct, based on (a) a methodological confound we ser-
endipitously uncovered and (b) a fundamental flaw in the 
reasoning and design of the past work. As we review next, 
Rule, Johnson, and Freeman’s (2016) reply falls short of 
addressing either of these issues. 
Internal Validity Problems in Past Face-Based Gaydar 
Research 
As reported in Cox et al. (2016), we found a quality con-
found in two stimulus sets collected in an attempt to rep-
licate and extend some of Rule et al.’s (2008) work on 
perceiving orientation from the face (i.e., “face-based gay-
dar”). We discovered a natural confound, such that gay 
men’s and lesbian women’s pictures were of higher quality 
than those of their straight counterparts. When we con-
trolled for quality statistically or matched the stimuli on 
quality, the “gaydar” effects found in previous work disap-
peared. Rule et al. (2016) did not present any data or argu-
ments that disputed or tried to explain this nonreplication. 
In response to the possibility that their stimulus sets may 
contain the same quality confound, they collected data on 
the quality of their stimuli, finding that quality confounds 
existed in only five of their 13 stimulus sets. Several of the 
confounds in their stimulus sets were in the opposite di-
rection of the confound we discovered, which they erro-
neously offered as evidence against our claims. Rule and 
colleagues (2016) seem to misunderstand our original ar-
ticle. The quality confounds, in our stimuli and in theirs, 
are a serious threat to internal validity, not a pattern that 
we theoretically predicted in a particular direction. Any ex-
periment with built-in confounds is inherently undermined 
by those confounds, no matter their direction. With our 
two stimulus sets and Rule and colleagues’ (2008) 13 sets, 
in total 47% of the stimulus sets contained quality con-
founds, which does not inspire confidence about the in-
ternal validity of this area of work. 
Quality is but one confound that may exist among 
stimulus sets. Because Rule and colleagues (2008) do not 
share their stimuli with outside research teams, other sci-
entists cannot evaluate any other dimensions on which 
their stimuli may differ. Nevertheless, even if further stud-
ies can address these internal validity threats and replicate 
past patterns of “accurate” orientation perception, doing 
so will not address the more fundamental flaw inherent in 
the reasoning underlying this area of work.  
Evidence of Accuracy in the Lab Provides Evidence of 
Inaccuracy in the Real World 
Rule et al. (2016) repeatedly state that our article ignored 
large swaths of evidence demonstrating the accuracy of 
gaydar. This claim, however, is incorrect. Although we did 
not specifically cite and review every paper they men-
tioned, we concretely identified a mathematical and logi-
cal error that is shared by all past gaydar research (see Cox 
et al., 2016, pp. 167–168; see also Plöderl, 2014). In so do-
ing, we directly demonstrated that the patterns heralded 
as evidence of accurate gaydar in fact provide direct evi-
dence that gaydar is highly inaccurate. 
Gaydar studies largely follow the same basic formula, 
as follows: Participants are asked to make gay-or-straight 
judgments based on stimuli (e.g., pictures, video, sound 
clips) gathered from gay men and straight men.1 Half of 
the stimuli come from straight men and half come from 
1. We crafted our example with gay and straight men, for simplicity and to match the majority of past work reporting to demonstrate accurate gay-
dar. The same mathematical principles and conclusions apply, however, to studies about categorization of lesbian and straight women, and to the 
rare studies that examine bisexual categorization.   
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gay men, and accuracy is assessed relative to 50% chance, 
which is the accuracy rate one would get if participants 
were purely guessing. In this work, people typically have 
55% to 65% accuracy, which is significantly higher than 
50% chance. Based on this evidence, then, do people 
have accurate gaydar? At first glance, the answer seems 
to be yes; people are correct more than they are incor-
rect. Further thought, however, reveals that this conclu-
sion is erroneous. 
The fundamental error in this work is its reliance on 
artificial base rates, in which 50% of the targets are gay. 
In the real world, the best estimates we have say that, 
at most, 5% of men identify as gay (Savin-Williams, 
2006). This consideration of ecological validity drastically 
changes the interpretation of the 60% accuracy rate.2 Fig-
ure 1 shows what a 60% accuracy rate looks like when 
translated to the real world, where only 5% of men are 
gay. An accuracy rate of 60% means that 40% of straight 
men are miscategorized as gay, and this 40% far outnum-
bers the 5% of men who are actually gay. Once real-world 
base rates of gay men are considered, all available evi-
dence from past work indicates that when perceivers “use 
their gaydar” to conclude that someone is gay, they will be 
wrong 93% of the time. Overall accuracy of 60% translates 
to 7% accuracy for identifying who is gay. This statistic is 
readily derived from the data of all past gaydar studies, 
and it provides a very clear answer: There is no pragmatic 
accuracy to gaydar.  
Next Steps: Saving the Baby From the Bathwater 
Our critique of past gaydar research is most precisely fo-
cused on the claim that “people can accurately perceive 
who is gay.” Based on all available evidence, this conclu-
sion is mathematically incorrect. An alternate phrasing of 
this claim is that “people can accurately perceive orien-
tation,” which, arguably, seems more justified, given that 
60% of the straight men are categorized correctly. But 
even this claim is misleading when one notes that if peo-
ple assumed that everyone was straight, they would have 
95% accuracy. Any alleged process for “perceiving orien-
tation” is meaningless if it does not yield pragmatic ac-
curacy for identifying members of the numerical minority 
from among the majority. Furthermore, we have shown 
2. This mathematical reasoning involves a basic application of Bayes’s theorem, which is necessary for understanding probabilities and accuracy 
(Hooper, 2013; McGrayne, 2011). 
3. This research objective brings with it many other potential difficulties to consider, most especially representative sampling of sexual minorities 
(Harry, 1986).   
Figure 1. Laboratory 
evidence of gaydar ac-
curacy provides evi-
dence of real-world in-
accuracy. Past gaydar 
research typically re-
ports a 60% accuracy 
rate in lab studies us-
ing a false base rate in 
which 50% of the tar-
gets are gay men. This 
figure shows what 60% 
accuracy looks like 
when translated to a 
real-world situation in 
which only 5% of men 
are gay. Out of ev-
ery 100 men, there will 
be 38 miscategorized 
straight men and three 
correctly categorized 
gay men. Based on all 
published evidence, us-
ing gaydar to identify 
someone as gay will be 
incorrect 93% of the 
time (38 / [38 + 3] = 
92.7%).  
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experimentally that this claim perpetuates stereotyping 
to infer orientation (Cox et al., 2016), a stereotyping pro-
cess that has adverse consequences (Cox & Devine, 2014; 
Forscher et al., 2015). 
Although the conclusion that people can accurately 
perceive orientation is incorrect, the research that has 
been used to support that conclusion can still inform the 
literature in meaningful ways. As we noted previously (Cox 
et al., 2016, p. 168), lab studies with artificial base rates can 
be useful for exploring intergroup similarities and differ-
ences between straight people and lesbian, gay, and bi-
sexual (LGB) people.3 For example, learning about what 
factors cause sexual orientation has been one of the big-
gest areas of study for sexuality researchers (DeLama-
ter & Hyde, 1998). Insomuch as these past studies docu-
ment meaningful group similarities and differences that 
can build or test theories about the etiology of orienta-
tion, they are highly valuable to sexuality science (e.g., Le-
Vay, 2011; Rieger et al., 2010). 
Even if they yield no pragmatic accuracy, understand-
ing the cues people use to make snap judgments about 
orientation also has tremendous potential to inform our 
understanding of social perception, bias, and discrimi-
nation. If someone’s facial structure, gait, or voice leads 
to a snap judgment or tacit inference about orientation, 
what consequences does that have? Will it affect hiring 
outcomes? Will it lead to social avoidance, anti-gay ag-
gression, or other prejudice-related behaviors? Do these 
snap judgments lead to additional stereotypic inferences, 
for instance, about abilities, proclivities, and personality 
traits? Although we have shown that using stereotypes 
to infer sexual orientation leads to meaningful behav-
ioral outcomes (Cox & Devine, 2014), we are not aware 
of any research demonstrating that inferences based on 
the face, voice, or body movement lead to discriminatory 
or prejudicial outcomes. Inferences based on these traits 
will not be accurate in the real world, but it is clear from 
this prolific body of work that people do use them to 
make snap judgments about orientation. The behavioral 
processes that follow these snap judgments are open for 
future exploration. Even if people cannot always accu-
rately judge a book by its cover, there is much we can 
learn from the fact that people often make those judg-
ments anyway.  
ORCID — William T. L. Cox  
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